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would like to start by saying how 
commendable I think it is that the Federal
Reserve Bank of St. Louis is conducting
this work on the monetary base.  In that
regard, it might be useful to describe one
set of facts that illustrates how important it
is to make adjustments for changes in
reserve requirements.  About a year ago, the
IMF published a small study that I did with
Monica Hargraves in which we tried to pro-
mote use of the growth rate of the monetary
base minus predicted growth in the perma-
nent component of base velocity as an indi-
cator of the medium-term stance of
monetary policy.1 We compiled such mea-
sures for all the G-7 economies going back
to 1960 and argued that this measure pro-
vided a better description than contending
indicators of the relative “looseness” or
“tightness” of economic policy in these
countries over time.  In doing this, we had
to make adjustments to the basic base series
of currency plus reserves.  That came as no
surprise to me, as I had previously found a
need for such adjustments in my 1993
study of Japanese monetary policy.  But
even so, I was surprised by the extreme
nature of this need in the case of France in
the 1970s.
The IMF publishes a measure of the
unadjusted base that it calls Reserve Money
(line 14 in International Financial
Statistics).  The value of this reserve money
at the end of 1974 was 152.3 billion French
francs (FF), and at the end of 1975 it was
119.4 billion, which is a drop of well over
20 percent.  On the face of it, this change
would seem to indicate a monetary tight-
ening of truly epic proportions, but there
was no sign of any such tightening in the
statistics for nominal GDP , the price level, or
even monetary aggregates such as M1 or
M2.  The reason, we discovered, was that
reserve requirements on sight deposits were
decreased over the year from 17 percent to 2
percent, which “freed up” about 44 billion
of reserves.  When we took account of that
decrease by developing our series for an
adjusted monetary base, the data made very
good sense.  Our adjustments were very
simple compared to what is done by the St.
Louis Fed, but they seemed to work reason-
ably well.  But if more nations had well-
developed and published magnitudes for the
adjusted monetary base, it would be much
easier for us, as researchers, to do our work.
Also, I suspect that the value of the mone-
tary base as a measure of monetary policy
actions would be more widely recognized.
I didn’t originally intend to say more
about the McCallum-Hargraves study, but
Don Kohn’s rather strong comments
concerning the weakness of the base as an
indicator variable have prompted me to add
a few more sentences, because our results
were much more encouraging in that regard.
I think he would agree that there have been
some signiﬁcant mistakes in monetary
policy in the G-7 economies since 1960, so I
would like to ask Don, ﬁrst, to specify in
which years policy was too tight and in
which years it was too loose for each of
these economies—i.e., applying his judg-
ment in retrospect to the information that
we have now.  Second, I would ask him to
specify his favorite policy indicator, which
might be a ﬁxed-weight index of several
macroeconomic variables.  And I will con-
jecture that our velocity-adjusted mon-
etary base growth rate, which can be calcu-
lated on a real-time basis, will have done a
better job than his favorite indicator in sig-




The study by Dueker and Serlitis per-
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(1995).effects on relationships and other studies
of the difference between the new and old
measures of the St. Louis adjusted
monetary base.  There will be and should
be more such studies, but these authors
have made a good start. 
I am especially interested in the ﬁrst
section of the article, since it concerns the
policy rule for controlling the monetary base
so as to provide smooth non-inﬂationary
growth on nominal GDP—a rule that I have
been promoting for several years.  In my
own studies2 I have tried to determine how
the rule would have performed historically
in the face of estimated shocks to the macro-
economy of the United States and some
other countries, and the question of how the
revision in base statistics would affect those
studies seems highly relevant and quite
interesting.  The same could be said for the
Judd and Motley (1991, 1992) extensions of
my work, which feature stochastic rather
than historical simulations, and also the
studies by Dueker (1993) in which he
examined the rule’s robustness with respect
to stochastic time variation in the
parameters of a base-velocity model (which
is what he uses as a macro model).
This is not quite what is done in the
Dueker-Serletis study, however.  Instead, the
authors have backed out estimates of what
implicit nominal GDP growth targets would
have been, given observed base growth
rates, if these had been generated by a policy
process that was using a rule somewhat like
mine to target GDP growth.  They conduct
this exercise using both the old and new
adjusted base measures, and they conclude
that the match between the implied target
GDP growth rates and actual rates since
1988 is closer with the new base measure.  
I am frankly not sure what to make of
that, given that their rule actually differs
from mine in two signiﬁcant respects
(which I will discuss further on in this
presentation) and also given that their ana-
lytical framework involves an assumption
that the Fed has had nominal GDP targets
that have switched between two target
growth values in response to some
unobserved state variables. In fact, I would
have to say that the authors do not give
enough description of their setup to make it
easily accessible to the reader without study
of some other works.  What they have done
constitutes a sophisticated and interesting
exercise, but at its end I still don’t know
whether the new base series gives results
more encouraging or less encouraging for
the properties of my proposed rule.
The two ways that the version of the
rule studied by Dueker and Serletis differs
from mine are that (1) they include no feed-
back term to provide adjustments in
response to target misses, and (2) they use a
procedure for estimating future velocity
growth that is unlike my use of average
velocity growth over the most recent four
years.  With respect to the latter, their
implicit objective, taken from Dueker and
Fischer (1996), is different: Their velocity
growth term is designed as a predictor of the
next quarter’s velocity growth.  Mine, by
contrast, is supposed to be a predictor of
average velocity growth over the indeﬁnite
future.  The point is that, in my rule, a delib-
erate attempt is made to keep responses to
cyclical conditions quite separate from
responses to slower-moving (and quasi-per-
manent) institutional changes.  By contrast,
a good predictor of velocity growth over the
next quarter will take account of cyclical
conditions.  I would guess that it is this fea-
ture of the Dueker-Serletis velocity term that
leads the authors to ﬁnd the target-miss
feedback term unimportant.
Another point that should be
mentioned is that for several years I have
been favoring a version of my rule that
emphasizes GNP growth rate targets, rather
than growing level targets, thereby treating
past target misses as bygones.
In the second part of their article, the
authors investigate effects on several results
previously obtained from vector autoregres-
sion (VAR) studies.  They nicely document
that most of these results are qualitatively
unaffected by replacing the old base and
reserve measures with the new ones.  I ﬁnd
it a bit puzzling that they devote so much of
their discussion to an attempt to unravel
some of the substantive puzzles thrown up
by the VAR studies (under both new and old
measures), for that seems like a different
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to address.  Also, it is, in my opinion, a bit
unfortunate that they devoted so much of
their attention to these VAR studies,
because, in the process, they implied that
the studies’ innovations in either the fed
funds rate or some reserve variable is a good
measure of monetary policy actions.  My
objection to that assumption is this:  Do
they (or other researchers) believe that only
the surprise component of the Fed’s actions
is relevant?  For real output, that is an inter-
esting hypothesis, but it is one that would
certainly not be accepted by most practical
policymakers and, with respect to price-level
movements, it would be a downright bizarre
hypothesis.  But if output or prices respond
to the anticipated component of policy-
instrument movements, then the impulse
response function and variance decomposi-
tion measures (of the type found in the VAR
literature) are not measures of policy effects,
but only one component of those effects.
Furthermore, I would think that the regular
and predictable component of movements
in the Fed’s instrument is much greater than
that of the unpredictable surprise
component.  If my assumption is correct,
then these studies, as a class, leave out most
of what they are supposed to be studying.
Thus it would seem that the portion of the
Dueker-Serlitis article that is devoted to this
type of study is a bit excessive.
The third section of the article is
concerned with the recent Haslag-Hein
(1995) study, which suggests that macroeco-
nomic variables respond differently to
movements in the unadjusted base than to
movements in the reserve adjustment magni-
tude (RAM).  The authors recognize, but do
not emphasize, that the Haslag-Hein ﬁndings
implicitly constitute an attack on the useful-
ness of the adjusted St. Louis monetary base,
since that variable is designed to provide a
single summary index of the net effect of Fed
policy actions via open market operations,
discount-window lending, and reserve-
requirement changes.  In this regard, one
might say that the St. Louis Fed’s Research
Department deserves praise for being willing
to publish work that is so damaging to one
of its own most famous products. I, myself,
would ﬁnd their results very discouraging,
since I am  inclined to think of the base as a
good summary measure, except that the
results in question come from VAR studies
that are open to the objections that I
developed above.  Also, the results are open
to the objection that the identifying assump-
tions used by Haslag and Hein are not
terribly compelling.
In conclusion, let me express the hope
that these comments do not obscure
the fact that the Dueker-Serletis study is
skillfully executed and serves a
valuable function.
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